Democratic Alternative Information Service:
  Ross Garrad: Policies
  Electing a People's President:

The Election Process

The election process should reflect what I believe to be the attitude of the majority of Australians: we want the opportunity to be involved, and we don't want a politician foisted upon us, but if our elected representatives can get together and do the job properly, on our behalf, we are happy enough to let them do so. AS LONG AS IT'S CLEAR THAT WE'RE IN CHARGE.

1.  If the nomination process results in only one candidate, a joint sitting of Parliament will vote by secret ballot, with a two-thirds majority required for approval of the candidate.

A two-thirds majority would normally require bipartisan support - essential if the President is to fill the expected role. I would expect that on most occasions the entire process would result in a single candidate, approved by Parliament - the same result as for the Keating model, but achieved in a much more open and democratic manner.

2.  In the very unlikely event of rejection of the sole candidate, the nomination process would re-start, no more than one month after the sitting of Parliament. The rejected candidate's nomination would stand, subject to the right of withdrawal of the candidate or nominators.

I can realistically envisage just one situation in which the only candidate for President is likely to be rejected by Parliament, and that would occur if some serious skeletons emerged from that person's closet between nomination and the joint sitting of Parliament. In that situation the process should re-start, no doubt with additional nominations, and if the original candidate perseveres then the people will be able to pass judgement one way or the other.

3.  If there were more than one candidate, an election would be called, with the normal system of preferential voting being used to decide the identity of the President.

This is probably the most straightforward part of the process, though some thought needs to be given to the type of campaigning that would be expected, the use of public funds, and any necessity for laws prohibiting involvement by political parties.

Those who say an election would inevitably be a party-political contest should try to visualise some possible scenarios:

• One or more "parliamentary nominations" versus an "elector nomination" (nominated by 130,000 voters). Who would have an inherent advantage?
• A "parliamentary nomination" from one party versus a "parliamentary nomination" nominated by MP's with a variety of party allegiances. Who would have an inherent advantage?
• Even the worst-case scenario - two or more "parliamentary nominations" who are de facto party candidates, and no "elector nominations" - would be similar to the Irish system, which seems to work reasonably well. But Australia can do better.

This model provides an inherent motivation for the MP's to unite around a high-quality, non-political candidate, and thus avoid a full election. The Keating model provides an inherent motivation for the parties to take turns at occupying the Presidency - the only thing stopping them would be their lack of trust for one another.

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Ross Garrad, 5 November 1997